IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

IN RE:

FAITH ELYZABETH ANTONIO

Debtor

Debtor

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Tampa, Florida
December 7, 2020
10:10 A.M.

TRANSCRIPT EXCERPT OF HEARING

- (1) Pretrial Conference;
- (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (Doc. #7);
- (3) Plaintiff's Motion for Ruling on Objections to Third Party Discovery (Doc. #8).

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CATHERINE PEEK McEWEN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY COURT PERSONNEL.
TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE
APPROVED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS.

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Also Present: Faith Antonio

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1	EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS
2	(Time Noted: 10:10 a.m.)
3	THE COURT: Hello? CourtCall operator, is
4	John
5	MR. MEGNA: Sorry, Your Honor. I'm here. Yes,
6	Your Honor. (Indiscernible) Gino Megna on behalf of Faith
7	Antonio.
8	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Megna. And, yes, he
9	sounds like he's underwater so it's definitely our system.
10	We may have to shift you all over to Zoom.
11	All right. And then on the Plaintiff's side,
12	ladies first?
13	MR. SOLOMON: This is Sandy Solomon. Allison
14	Thompson is with me.
15	THE COURT: Okay. And, yes, you sound like
16	you're underwater too.
17	MR. MEGNA: Your Honor, I also have my client on
18	the line as well.
19	THE COURT: Okay. That was Mr. Megna?
20	MR. MEGNA: Yes, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Let's see if we can switch to
22	Zoom. Do you all mind doing Zoom?
23	MR. SOLOMON: We are not in a place that we can
24	do that, but we could can I have a couple minutes? We're
25	not really situated to do that at the moment.

THE COURT: Oh, okay then. Wait a minute. Wait just a minute. Let's see what we can do. I've got to get Laurie or somebody here to come down and troubleshoot. I hate to cause counsel to incur extra money to -- by rescheduling another CourtCall hearing.

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We actually have time, up until really about 11 o'clock because the two 10:30's are going to go very fast. We're just going to be continuing those. And the reason we didn't do it out of the box is we have two pro se defendants and we needed to tell them about it in open court. So the 10:30's aren't going to take that long. So just sit tight. We'll --

MR. SOLOMON: We hear you just fine and we could hear the other parties on the other -- everybody in the first hearing as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that, but I can't hear you very well. And you all are going to make real arguments. I'll tell you what. Let me talk. I'll talk for a while.

All right. What I see here on the motion to strike the affirmative defenses, Mr. Megna, I think most of that is well-taken. I think with regard to the one on damages and the one on ordinary course, those are really just denials. You know, to be accused of embezzlement, you deny it. Why do you deny it? Because it wasn't

embezzlement. It means that you didn't come into possession of funds legally and then convert them to your own use without permission. That's a denial.

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The Section 548(c), I don't know -- I don't know when you're looking at a 523 -- and then there's a 727, but if you're looking at 523's, you're looking at defenses under the 523's. And so you wouldn't -- you wouldn't mismatch the defenses; okay? And maybe you all have already talked about this and I'm wasting my breath. On the other hand --

MR. MEGNA: No, Your Honor, that one --

THE COURT: Huh, Mr. Megna?

MR. MEGNA: Yes. I agree with you, Judge. That one (indiscernible) 548(c).

THE COURT: Okay. So I went through some of those. I also know that there is a motion for a ruling on third-party discovery in a case that's not my case, my adversary proceeding, and I can't rule on those. I don't have any jurisdiction. The alternative is for me -- and I'll let you all vet this. I can abstain for a while, in other words abate this adversary proceeding, let you go over to state court, finish out your business over there, bring me back the result, which will drive my decision under principles of collateral estoppel. That's one choice.

Another choice -- and frankly it might be my preferred choice depending on what you tell me about how long the state court has had it. Another choice might be that you issue identical discovery in this adversary proceeding over which I would have jurisdiction to call balls and strikes on objections to motions to compel or call balls and strikes on a motion for a protective order.

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I can tell you that based on the allegations, I would be very reluctant to block that kind of discovery. I think it is relevant based on the claim that is pleaded in the complaint. And in terms of privacy issues, there's a balancing test under the State Constitution for that and, you know, frankly I'm not sure that credit cards, you know, maybe there is some sensitive information that the Defendant was purchasing things that might be embarrassing to her and so forth, but we can -- we can fashion a confidentiality order as has been suggested.

So that's kind of the way I was going to go on this motion for a ruling on objections to third-party discovery.

Let me track back to the motion to strike affirmative defenses. There are a couple of theories of estoppel. And it looks like the Plaintiff is honing in mostly on collateral estoppel, but there is regular estoppel too. But there are elements to those under the

state law. Let me see if I've got my White's -- W-H-I-T-E-S -- Florida Causes of Action and Defenses book up here.

Oh, I've got the little one. Hold on. This isn't as good as what I would -- as robust as the big one, but, you know, it's -- the Supreme Court case on equitable estoppel is -- it looks like -- this is an old book -- 2002 Westlaw

31662590 at asterisk 3. There's a Second DCA case cited at 816 So.2d 832. I should give you the names. In the Supreme Court case it's Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, so FDHRS. The Second DCA is Watson Clinic.

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There's an Eleventh Circuit case, Tefel, T-E-F, as in Frank, E-L, 180 F.3d 1286. And there's also -- I see a Middle District in this book. At any rate -- and then there are defenses to a claim for equitable estoppel, as well, that you can pick up. Promissory estoppel has got different elements.

And so, you know, Mr. Megna, you're going to have to plead which theory of estoppel you're going under there. Is it collateral; is it promissory; is it equitable?

And the way that we plead our affirmative defenses is as stated in the motion to strike. You plead it as if it's a pleading. You can't just use a name or a title of a certain kind of defense, you've got to lay out the elements rather precisely.

Now I don't mind a Rule 12(b)(6) defense pleaded as a defense. Let me get this.

I saw the case law, Mr. Solomon, that you cited but, you know, it is true that 12 says that you can lodge these as a defense instead and you don't need to do it in the form of a motion.

But if you're going to do it as a defense, you're going to have to lay out which elements, Mr. Megna, you believe are missing. So you can't just say, fails to state a claim. You have to say What did they leave out? That's how you plead an affirmative defense on a motion -- excuse me, on a 12(b) motion to state a claim.

One last point. Judge Moody always says this:
Unless you know that there is no way they could plead a
certain kind of claim, you should sit on your hands and not
raise a motion to dismiss because it gives them a chance to
fix their pleadings. That's the message he gives young
lawyers and that's a message I give you because you're a
young lawyer.

And so I have given you a lot of stuff and I have talked a lot. We still don't have a technician here.

COURTROOM DEPUTY: He's on his way.

THE COURT: On her way -- on his way? Hey, Bill. Bill Miguenes is here.

So what if I were to send you back, Mr. Megna,

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and give you an opportunity to replead the affirmative defenses? I would grant the motion to strike except for the -- well, I would grant it, but I would permit you to include the failure to state a claim if you choose to reinclude it with precision. And how much time would you need to replead the affirmative defenses, Mr. Megna?

MR. MEGNA: Judge, if you can give me (indiscernible) -- can I have seven days?

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THE COURT: You can take 14; okay? Same with waiver.

MR. MEGNA: That works, (indiscernible)

THE COURT: Same with waiver, too. I'm getting that the theme here is these people, the principle behind the --

MR. MEGNA: Your Honor, (indiscernible) -- it's based on laches as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. And laches, you know, that usually is the statute of limi -- it usually is guided by what the statute of limitations is. They usually run hand and glove, but you can replead laches but then we'll probably have a dispositive motion on that one. And there's case law out there that talks about when laches is good and when it's not good. And it's maybe that there is now insufficient documentary evidence because of the lapse of time and that you shouldn't be bound by just the statute

of limitations. But do some research on laches and when it's appropriate So I'm going to allow you to replead. You can have 14 days.

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And we'll do a jiffy order for you, Mr. Solomon. Mr. Solomon, a jiffy order is something we just do a checkbox. We grant your motion to strike based on the colloquy on the record and then there's a line that says, Defendant shall have 14 days to replead the affirmative defenses. Is that okay with you?

MR. SOLOMON: Yes, ma'am. (indiscernible). We had discussed this at the conference of counsel and I had thought that Mr. Megna was going to replead because if he repleads with the specificity that we believe is required for each and every one of the defenses, then we can go from there. We will just reply to close the pleadings knowing what he's talking about. But merely raising an affirmative defense by (indiscernible) is insufficient. And Mr. Megna and I have discussed that. We had thought he was going to do that before today.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, he didn't but you've got the motion, I've ruled on it, and he'll do that.

Now with regard to the objections on the thirdparty discovery, how long has the state court had the case?

MR. SOLOMON: The case has been outstanding since August or September. And with respect to these discovery

requests, we served third-party subpoenas and discovery requests directly to Ms. Antonio. They haven't produced anything. They filed a series of objections and we have been at this with prior counsel before Mr. Megna got involved in the state court case. And we floated the idea of the confidentiality agreement and have now sent that four or five different times without response.

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I think it's a very simple question because we don't have any objection to limiting the exposure that Ms. Antonio may feel by having a confidentiality agreement. And now that it's been out there for two-and-a-half months, three months, I think that we could probably resolve this if they would just respond to the confidentiality. The state law is very clear as you had indicated was your understanding of the law anyway, that if the discovery is relevant to claims that are pled, and our complaint is pled with great specificity, that we're entitled to that discovery.

Much of what they raised initially in the state court was that these were not documents that belonged to Ms. Antonio, but that they belonged to DGP and that was the reason why we shouldn't be able to seek the discovery. But that's a non-sequitur. And then we said there are a series of documents that were created or accounts that were created in the name of DGP by Ms. Antonio that we did not

know of and that's part of the problem where we go to these third-party providers, whether they be credit cards, banks, or, if you will, software apps that are used in the business. And this has been going on for four months without an ability to actually have a hearing in state court.

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And what we were trying to do by filing the motion with you was to avoid all of the expense of reserving all of the subpoenas and then waiting for objections again and going through the process both time-wise and expense-wise because they're the same objections that they raised before. In fact, what I would propose is that if they have any objections to the state court discovery that was already served on the third parties, that they merely refile those objections now before you and allow that decision to be made by you in this court so that we don't have to go re-serve.

Because we re-serve and then we get telephone conversations with Citibank and Chase and we have (indiscernible) all over the country. So we had to get subpoenas issued by the state courts in other states. That was an expense. And then in some states, as you probably are aware, we have to actually open a new case which costs somewhere between 250 and \$500 just to open those state court cases to have a subpoena issued on those parties who

don't have a direct presence in Florida and have to be served out of state, for example, on the West Coast.

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So this was merely an attempt to get a shorthand resolution and we would like to avoid having to redo all of the discovery. And then deferring to the state court is just going to engender another delay. I don't even know whether the judge that was originally assigned to the case is going to remain in the same division because as you know they'll all switch in January. And with the new judges taking their seats on January 19th or 20th, that's just going to engender another delay and --

THE COURT: Okay. I've heard --

MR. SOLOMON: -- (Indiscernible) --

THE COURT: -- enough. I've heard enough. Hold on. I've heard enough. It hasn't been in the state court that long, so abatement is not an appropriate thing here.

Now I don't -- the stay is in effect with respect to litigation in the state court. Unless Mr. Megna will agree and consent to treating that discovery as if it was made in this adversary proceeding and is subject to my jurisdiction, I can't really touch it.

It's so much easier to issue discovery in bankruptcy court because you may simply mail subpoenas to these third parties with documents and you would need not -- I don't think you need to go to any other bankruptcy

court to have subpoenas issued. So it's very customary where we have people subpoenaing, you know, Fifth Third Bank, Bank of America, wherever and they get the documents in.

I would urge you all to talk some more and look at Bankruptcy Rule 1001 and live by the spirit of it. And, Mr. Megna, you are familiar with the case, I think, I probably have mentioned it to you, of Sahlyers v. Prugh, S-A-H-L-Y-E-R-S v. Prugh, P-R-U-G-H, the decision by Judge Edmondson -- Judge Edmondson was Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit then -- and he talks about the need for counsel to remember that you are -- your maybe primary duty is the duty to the court and the system in ensuring the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every claim. And he says that the lawyers are officers of the court in that regard.

I think that what Mr. Solomon has suggested could be done by consent in the spirit of Bankruptcy Rule 1001, but I'm going to let you all talk about that and I'll continue this hearing until after we have the affirmative defenses already in hand, and so if it's going to be a 14-day turnaround on that, something that's about a month away, and see if you can come up with a consensual resolution on this discovery.

Mr. Megna, it's going to come in. It's going to

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come in.

2 MR. MEGNA: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Frankly, the way I see this is there's a bunch of expenses. There may or may not be some irregularities in the creation of some documents. The defense apparently is that these people had a relationship with each other and that there was a free hand given to the Defendant to do certain things. If she didn't report these things as income, that's going to be an issue unless, you know, she can make a credible case that the company gifted her company treasury money.

I'll tell you that I have an issue with the fid -- I think that there might be an issue with the fiduciary allegation, Mr. Solomon. That could come up on a dispositive motion. I also looked at the 727. That one I'm not convinced yet that that's the proper stuff of 727, but I haven't done any research, you'll have to find some cases, but that may be a dispositive issue or ripe for a dispositive motion at some time.

I do think you all should mediate. **AUDIO ENDED**

(End of requested excerpt. Time Noted: 10:30 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE

I, Gretchen L. Schultz, Certified Electronic Reporter, hereby certify that the foregoing is the official transcript, prepared to the best degree possible from the digital audio recording and logs provided by the court.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor an employee of any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken.

I further certify that I have no personal interest in the outcome of the action.

Stofeland Schull

SIGNED this 5th day of April, 2024.

GRETCHEN L. SCHULTZ, CER

Transcriber